New Developments in the Chinese Social Sciences
Daniel Little
University of Michigan-Dearborn
Mapping Difference:
Structures and Categories of Knowledge Production
May 19-20, 2006
Organized by Sucheta
Mazumdar and Vasant Kaiwar
I begin with a premise: Chinese social sciences are in an important period of transition today. The methods and assumptions of classical Marxism-Leninism are no longer governing, and new paradigms have not yet taken full form. This transition is especially important because of the magnitude and novelty of the social changes that China is experiencing today. This paper provides a first scan of some emerging strands of sociological research in China today. And it advocates for the importance of non-positivist approaches to sociological causation for Chinese sociology. The paper argues for the timeliness of engagement between innovative Chinese and western sociologists in an effort to arrive at models of social research and explanation that work well for contemporary China.
This is an exercise in “experimental” philosophy of social science; or you might call it “ethnography of the social sciences.” It is just a beginning, and I am laboring under large handicaps. The largest of these is the barrier of language; I do not speak or read Chinese, and cannot follow the social science literature in China first-hand. But the issue is an important one, and it will be worthwhile to arrive at some answers to the questions I pose here. So I’m willing to take the risk of jumping in.
The central question is this: what are some of the primary frameworks and methodologies that are emerging within the social sciences in China today, as a basis for achieving the most effective social science research within the Chinese university in the future?
If we were to say, “the social sciences are everywhere the same,” we would be beginning with an enormous error. Politics, culture, institutions, and history affect the ways in which scientists are educated; the methodologies that they respect as most “scientific”; the questions that are taken to be the most important; the theoretical perspectives that are thought to be most promising in explaining social outcomes. This is true in all areas of science—physics, biology, economics. But it is especially true in the social sciences, for two large reasons: the political and practical salience of social interpretation and explanation; and the amorphousness and frangibility of social phenomena themselves. There are multiple processes underway at any given time within a social order; these co-exist in a messy complexity; and therefore the “systematizing” impulse that has guided the development of so many of the sciences is less valid in the social sciences.
My perspective flows from a career-long interest in the philosophy of social science. I believe that the intellectual challenges posed by the social sciences are, if anything, more difficult and obscure than those in other areas of the sciences. What do we mean by a “social” “science”? What is the nature of the social? What is involved in a scientific study of the social? Further, I believe that we cannot pose these questions in the abstract; it is necessary to develop our questions and answers in close partnership between practitioners and philosophers. In other words: we need to probe in depth, the ontologies, research methodologies, puzzles, debates, and theories of sociology, political science, economics, geography, the area studies—and then arrive at some more informed ideas about what is involved in studying and explaining aspects of the social world.
Second, I have a long-standing interest in China. My book, Understanding Peasant China, was an exercise in applied philosophy of social science. It picked out four specific debates in the China field and applied some of the analytical tools of philosophy to coming to a better understanding of these debates. I looked at the “rational peasant” debate; Skinner’s economic geography of China; several theories of peasant mobilization and rebellion; and several theories of economic stagnation. I’ve now prepared the book for a Chinese edition, with two new chapters. One is on the “Involution” debate that has been so heated in China studies in the past several years; the other is on the role of causal mechanisms in good social science explanations.
Another bit of relevant experience is the opportunity I had last summer to teach a graduate course on “Western Philosophy of Social Science” at Peking University. This was an outstanding opportunity to explore ideas about social science explanation and China studies, with some very smart Chinese graduate students and faculty. During the same visit, I was able to visit with sociologists at PKU and at Suzhou University in the Shanghai region and to meet with presidents of half a dozen Chinese universities. Many of the impressions I have formed in preparation for this talk derive from these experiences.
Finally, I decided to approach my question today by doing some direct inquiry. I have talked over the past year with American social scientists with expertise on China, about the question of the current state of Chinese social science. I decided to extend this set of ideas by soliciting input from a handful of social scientists in China. Accordingly, I put together a questionnaire and survey and asked sociologists and social researchers at PKU and Suzhou University to give me their impressions of the state of social science in China today.
The frameworks – it would not be wrong to call them “dogmas” – of Marxism-Leninism were dominant in Chinese social thought from the Revolution through the Cultural Revolution (1949-1980s). This framework was not intellectually productive; and it is no longer binding, institutionally or intellectually. This framework clustered social-historical thinking around several fundamental themes: a stylized interpretation of the stages of history; the overwhelming “logic” of class struggle; focus on the forces and relations of production; and insistence on the framework of dialectical materialism.
Since the 1980s the institutional pressures for ideological correctness have abated a great deal. China has undergone economic reform in many sectors, in ways that are at odds with dogmatic Marxism. The political hegemony of Mao has abated. And following the re-opening of the universities following the end of the Cultural Revolution, there has been a greater degree of openness to intellectual independence within the universities. So Marxism is no longer a coercive shell for social science theory and research. And it is no longer a compelling theory on the basis of which young intellectuals attempt to understand the world.
This whole set of issues is more complicated by the issue of the state of Chinese universities today. There is a greater degree of freedom for faculty members to pursue and publish their research; but there are limits. And, almost by definition, the subjects of social science research are also the subjects most likely to be controversial from the point of view of the state and party. It was a surprise to me to learn that the president of a Chinese university is the second-ranked official in the university; the party secretary is the more powerful and influential official in the university. Faculty members who investigate sensitive issues are very cautious in discussing their work—for example, research on current conditions in Tibet. We have to ask ourselves the question: how much academic and intellectual independence does a senior social scientist have in studying the conditions of minorities in Tibet? The university does not embody the institutions of tenure; it does not strongly advocate for the importance of academic freedom and independence; and faculty members’ careers are clearly affected by powerful outsiders. So the results of social science research are likely to be “tailored” to the views of the state—especially on issues of current political controversy.
This is not to suggest that the Chinese university is a tightly controlled ideological environment. There is an increasing openness to independent social theorizing, which is developing at a moderate pace. Leading universities have grown environments where social science faculty can do research reasonably independently, on subjects and using perspectives that would have been highly unacceptable a dozen years ago. Evidence: current Chinese sociology focused on industry transition. One faculty member at PKU put the point this way to me: I can do my research according to my theoretical judgments; I can publish my research in academic journals; but I cannot put these ideas into more public forums. The “inside discuss, outside refrain” rule.
Another factor that will affect the future of the social sciences in China is the current emphasis on improving the quality of the leading universities. The Chinese leadership is very interested in taking steps to create internationally ranked universities based on world-class research. This will imply encouraging sociologists, demographers, and economists to bring their research up to world standards. But this emphasis may also lead China’s educational policy makers to push the social sciences towards the example of the “most successful” models of social science research in the West; and this is likely to be positivist quantitative social science research.
Here is another reason to think that the social sciences in China are positioned for substantial change in the near future: the depth and pace of social and economic change that China is experiencing. Just think of the complexity and magnitude of the processes that have been underway in China: revolution, Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, privatization of agriculture, privatization of industry, development of TVEs, full incorporation in the global economy, emergence as a manufacturing super power, joining WTO, population movements, migration, re-emergence of significant social and geographical inequalities, shifting balance of power between center and region and between government and private players, the rise of rural collective action and protest, …
And—these processes are not understood! We do not have comprehensive theories for which China’s experience is the special case—whether “modernization theory,” “world systems theory,” “rational choice theory,” “theory of exploitation”; in fact, it is a radical misunderstanding of the nature of the social, to imagine that there might be such theories. Rather, China’s social development is a contingent, multi-threaded social congeries; we should expect unpredictable twists and turns, the forming and dissolving of institutions and social compromises; the changing policies of the state and the party; the strategic behavior of peasants and rural people; … These changes are as deep, rapid, and perplexing as those associated with the process of industrialization in 19th century England—and consider how profoundly the experience of Manchester and Birmingham stimulated new sociological thinking in the hands of Engels, Tocqueville, Marx, and the other founders of modern western sociology.
How can social observers understand these complex processes? How can scholars and governments take their measure? How can government create policies that affect these outcomes? Is it possible to draw broad predictions about China’s future—for example, “economic liberalization, political control”? Or would it be reasonable to argue that economic liberalization and the extension of access to information leads unavoidably to greater democracy and public participation?
The social sciences in China thus have a major challenge and a major opportunity: to arrive at justified and reliable ways of observing and measuring the processes of change underway; and to arrive at theories of the causes that are driving these processes. Is this a process of “modernization”? Is it a distinctive historical trajectory? Are there multiple processes at work simultaneously? Are there existing social theories that permit us to understand China’s complex experience? (I favor “distinct historical trajectory” and “multiple processes” over the other two theories.)
An inventory of social change in
China
What are the big social processes that are underway in China that need to be described and understood? Most visibly is the economic transformation associated with neo-liberalism and reform. The reform of agriculture in the 1980s had massive and still influential effects. The reform of the institutional setting of manufacture and international trade has created very large currents and pressures in Chinese society: smashing of the brass rice bowl, stimulus to massive internal migration, creation of new ensembles of powerful players, creating of wealth, immiseration of some workers, … Seen from a narrowly economic point of view, the question is: how can China sustain 10% rates of economic growth? What further policy changes and institutional reforms will be necessary?
Seen from the broader point of view, the question is: what are the social implications of this massive economic transformation? What is happening to displaced workers? How do workers reason about the choices they are faced with when privatization occurs? What changes have occurred within factories? What implications are emerging for public health, for the care of the elderly, or for access to education? What are the conditions of social well-being across China? How are these circumstances over time?
Something like 70% of China’s population is rural. The transformations that are underway in the countryside are very important. Something like a process of “primitive accumulation” is underway, with a corresponding struggle between farmers and power-holders over ownership and control of land. The inequalities that have commonly existed between city and countryside are evidently more extreme than ever since 1949; incomes are rising rapidly in the urban manufacturing and service economy, and farmers’ incomes are stagnant. Farmers’ access to social services is very limited, including access to education.
Corresponding to some of these points about rural property ownership and inequalities, is a dramatic increase in the volume of rural protest and collective action. Tens of thousands of instances of collective protest and unrest occur every year in the countryside—and the incidence is rising. The state is concerned about conditions in the countryside; but its response is muted and confused. At some points the rhetoric of the state has been pro-peasant in the past few years; but there is also a “law and order” thread that offers the stick rather than social reform. Complicating the issue is the disconnect between the central government’s policies and the actions of local and provincial governments. The interests of the local and provincial governments are often tilted towards “development” and modernization – with corresponding lack of support for peasants’ rights. The central state appears to lack the ability to control the use of coercion by local authorities in putting down peasant collective action and protest.
A common cause of rural unrest is the fact of local corruption and abuse of the powers of local authorities. The study of corruption, and the institutions of state and market that might help to control corrupt practices, is an important subject for Chinese social scientists. Parallel to corruption is the question of the extension of the system of law. To what extent are players able to appeal to their rights and to gain access to processes of law enforcement? Are there emerging NGOs and independent organizations that support workers’ and peasants’ rights?
Internal migration and the status of ethnic minorities are other important subjects for study by Chinese social scientists. Once again, these are processes that are changing rapidly; it will be important for Chinese demographers, social policy analysts, and ethnographers to put together effective research programmes that will track and explore these processes.
“Marx in Shanghai.” I posed to my students at PKU last summer, this question: What if Karl Marx had been born in Shanghai in 1960? What sorts of analysis might he have arrived at? What would Capital have looked like? I suggest that the book would have been less exclusive in its focus on the “economic mode of production.” It would have given less prominence to the labor theory of value, even as it would have retained some scheme for tracking value and wealth. Political institutions, and the forms of power associated with office and position, would have been a prominent part of the analysis. The role and dynamics of great cities would have come in. The book would have paid much more attention to international economic relations—Wallerstein would have found his place in a Marxist analysis of globalization. (Why do I think these things? Because Marx was an astute and nuanced social observer; and these are crucial factors in metropolitan China in the 1980s-2000.)
But a distinctly Marxist analysis could nonetheless have emerged. The Chinese version of Capital would have emphasized some of the same human and social circumstances that are highlighted in Capital: coercion, inequality; the leverage provided for the personnel of the state; exploitation; population movement; alienation. The result would have been a different theory, emphasizing different social mechanisms; but giving primacy to many of the same large social characteristics of inequality, domination, and exploitation; perhaps more about the full social order, less microscopic view of the economic relations of “capitalism.” Die sozialmatrix rather than Das kapital.
So far, I’ve asserted that there is a paradigm vacuum in China’s social science establishment, and that the pace of change in China makes it urgent to arrive at effective academic institutions for social science research. Moreover, the government’s emphasis on achieving research success parallel to that of Western institutions suggests that there will be substantial institutional pressure towards more “successful” social science research. But what directions will this effort be likely to take?
There is an “attractive hazard” that will be difficult to avoid. This is the hazard of the seductive appeal of “scientific quantitative social science.” Count and measure. Look for objective facts and patterns; laws of social change. As all of us know, there are persistent debates and disagreements within American social scientists over the divide of “quantitative versus comparative and qualitative” research; or between formal modeling and nuanced exploration of institutions (in political science). But the high-prestige end of these debates is the more positivistic approach: the social sciences must be based on statistical analysis of large uniform data sets; formal models based on consumer behavior assumptions are preferred to more nuanced efforts to explain particular processes.
I describe this as a hazard, not
because quantitative social science is always flawed, but because the nature of
the social gives us good reason to believe that we need to have a plurality of
methods in order to understand social processes.
An important benchmark relevant to the prestige of quantitative social science in China is the fanfare that accompanied the creation of a collaboration between U of M’s Institute for Social Research and Peking University last summer. This collaboration will create the Program in Quantitative Social Science. The declared purpose of this collaboration is to bring some of the expertise and methodologies having to do with large social data sets and public opinion research to Chinese social scientists and graduate students. ISR faculty will teach classes at Peking University on survey methods, sampling and analytic techniques, and will train Chinese graduate students. The project will also establish a bi-annual survey of a representative sample of two Chinese provinces, leading to the establishment of a “high-quality, longitudinal data set that covers a comprehensive set of topics from health and family relationships to socioeconomic status.”
ISR’s faculty are somewhat receptive to a variety of approaches to social science research. Some express openness to qualitative, comparative, and oral-history approaches to social science research. At the same time, the language of the ISR collaboration is very much geared to quantitative approaches, involving large publicly collected datasets and public opinion research.
Another hazard is a bit more mundane: the challenge of formulating creative, insightful, and value-adding social science research programmes is a very difficult one. The easy way out is to simply build upon the examples of research paradigms of western political science, sociology, or anthropology, and to make better and better contributions to those research literatures. This is not going to suffice for China! The grand theories in sociology are not satisfactory. The approaches of western political science are valuable but limited. China needs new and more imaginative approaches to the core problem: how to analyze, describe, discover, and explain the vast, messy variety of social processes underway in China today.
I believe that the social sciences need to be framed out of consideration of a better understanding of the nature of the social—a better social ontology, if you like. The social world is not a system of law-governed processes; it is instead a mix of different sorts of institutions, forms of human behavior, natural and environmental constraints, and contingent events. The entities that make up the social world at a given time and place have no particular ontological stability; they do not fall into “natural kinds”; and there is no reason to expect deep similarity across a number of ostensibly similar institutions – states, for example, or labor unions. (Quine’s metaphor of the bushes shaped to look like elephants comes to mind here.) So the rule for the social world is – heterogeneity, contingency, and plasticity. And the metaphysics associated with our thinking about the natural world – laws of nature; common, unchanging structures; and predictable processes of change – do not provide appropriate metaphors for our understandings and expectations of the social world; nor do they suggest the right kinds of social science theories and constructs.
Instead of naturalism, I advocate for an approach to social science theorizing that could be described as “post-positivist realism.” It recognizes that there is a degree of pattern in social life – but emphasizes that these patterns fall far short of the regularities associated with laws of nature. It emphasizes contingency of social processes and outcomes. It insists upon the importance and legitimacy of eclectic use of social theory: the processes are heterogeneous, and therefore it is appropriate to appeal to different types of social theories as we explain social processes. It emphasizes the importance of path-dependence in social outcomes. It suggests that the most valid scientific statements in the social sciences have to do with the discovery of concrete social-causal mechanisms, through which some types of social outcomes come about. And finally, it highlights what I call “methodological localism”: the insight that the foundation of social action and outcome is the local, socially-located and socially constructed individual person. The individual is socially constructed, in that her modes of behavior, thought, and reasoning are created through a specific set of prior social interactions. And her actions are socially situated, in the sense that they are responsive to the institutional setting in which she chooses to act. Purposive individuals, embodied with powers and constraints, pursue their goals in specific institutional settings; and regularities of social outcome often result.
How can we best apply this approach to the social sciences? There are several current fields of social research that are particularly well suited to this approach. One is the field of comparative historical sociology, making use of fairly detailed studies of similar cases in order to identify common causal mechanisms. Kathleen Thelen’s astute studies of different institutions of skill formation in Germany, UK, US, and Japan are an excellent case in point; she asks the twin questions, what causal processes give stability to a set of institutions? And what causal processes lead to a process of transformation in those institutions? The research methods of comparative historical sociology, then, are particularly well suited to the ontology of contingency, plasticity, and causal mechanisms.
Ethnography gives us a different angle on this same ontology. Ethnographers can give us insight into culturally specific mentalities—the “socially constructed individuals”. And they can give concrete analysis of the institutions that both shape individuals and are in turn shaped by them.
The new institutionalism is an important third theoretical perspective on social analysis and explanation. This approach postulates the causal reality of institutions; it highlights the point that differences across institutions lead to substantial differences in behavior; and it provides a basis for explanations of various social outcomes. (The rules of liability governing the predations of cattle in East Africa or Shasta County, California, create very different patterns of behavior in cattle owners and other land owners in the various settings.)
These points are highly relevant to my main theme here today: the shaping of the next generation of Chinese social science. If Chinese social scientists are captivated by the scientific prestige of positivism and quantitative social science, they will be led to social science research that looks quite different from what would result from a view that emphasizes contingency and causal mechanisms. And if there are strong, engaging examples of other ways of conducting social research that can come into broad exposure in Chinese social science—then there is a greater probability of emergence of a genuinely innovative and imaginative approach to the problem of social knowledge.
Chief features--
In order to gather more specific information about the terrain of the social sciences in China today, I have put together a small survey questionnaire for a small handful of the social scientists I’ve met in China. The goal is to begin to map out a survey of the methodologies currently in use and the theoretical models, perspectives, and frameworks that are currently favored.
The questionnaire included six open-ended questions and a rating sheet for the importance of a number of theoretical and methodological perspectives. The open-ended questions were these:
The admittedly small number of sociologists surveyed produced rankings of theoretical frameworks and methodologies along the lines represented in Table 1.
Here are some summary observations about the focus and direction of Chinese social science, drawn from the open-ended questions.
There is some agreement that Chinese sociology is at its beginnings: “Social science, especially sociology, is on the beginning in China.” Another respondent says that “Chinese sociology is very similar to the methods used by US sociologists; maybe one or two years behind.” This observer writes that “we are learning the basic theories and methodologies from the West at this period … We will produce some of our theories in the future based on our research…. We will give our contribution to the discipline in the future.” Another gifted graduate student writes, “The future is bright for Chinese sociology.”
Most respondents agree that neo-liberal ideas are “very hot”. What direction should China take? Neo-liberal ideas about markets, law, and individual freedom. This aligns with the idea that China’s future involves rapid economic growth and this growth is premised on economic reforms. A thoughtful observer writes that “from the mid-1980s, Western theories, especially the modernization theory, came to influence Chinese scholars’ perspectives. In recent years, “internationalization” has become the most significant trend in the social sciences in China.” He also asserts that social scientists divide into two large groups: neo-liberals and neo-leftists. The first group emphasizes economic privatization and the latter emphasizes social fairness.
There is in fact high prestige for quantitative methods and western social science methods. One respondent writes that “the mainstream methodology in social science is positivism.” She adds, “Quantitative social science is very important. … Quantitative data is scientific. Not very good analysis of the methodology.” Another writes that quantitative methods are very important; but notes that there are currently no large social sampling surveys in China; this is identified as an important research investment by the government in the future. Another respondents writes that “quantitative methods are very important; sociology departments in most Chinese universities have courses on sociological methods, SPSS, etc.”
Marxist theory is not important, to judge from these results; this is described as “a residue from the influence of the Soviet Union.” A brilliant sociology graduate student writes that “few scholars use Marxism to explain Chinese social data.”
Some American observers believe that social Darwinism is an important theoretical glyph in Chinese social thinking today. This view is not born out by the comments or survey responses. One observer writes that “in academic research, social Darwinism is not important.” And the overall score of social Darwinism is close to the bottom of the ranking of theories and frameworks.
These respondents give some importance to qualitative methods, including interviews and oral histories. None of the respondents cites comparative historical research as being important at present. One observer writes that “there are not any important researches using comparative and qualitative method.” However, another respondent writes that “case studies and interviews are an important methodology for Chinese sociology.” And in fact, this respondent’s research illustrates this point. She studies the micro-sociology of the transition of state-owned enterprises to private ownership and management. Her research involves extensive qualitative interviews of workers, managers, and technicians, and an effort to reconstruct the reasoning of various participants as they reach decisions about their futures within the enterprise. She also makes use of the moral economy theory to explain participants’ choices.
There is an important strand of applied social research among Chinese social scientists: research on specific concrete social problems that have urgent contemporary consequences, with the idea that better understanding of these phenomena can guide effective government policy formation. These problems involve various features of social transition – social mobilization, social stratification, grass-roots democracy, farmer-workers in cities, unemployment problem, farmers who lost land.
For example, the RURC at Suzhou University is closely focused on the problems of rural to urban transformation: displacement of large numbers of rural people (farmers, fish farmers, other agricultural workers) by the expansion of urban and industrial spaces; and the disappearance of prior forms of social welfare assurance.
In addition to responses to these general questions, a young Chinese historian notes that there is some discussion of the subject of the status of the Chinese social sciences in Chinese journals. He cites a survey essay by Zhao Wenlong and Li Qian from Xian Jiaotong Daxue (Xian Jiaotong University), entitled “The current state and development of sociological studies in China and Canada: Comparisons and implications” (“Zhong Jia shehuixue yanjiu xianzhuang yu fazhan de bijiao ji qishi,” in Xian Jiaotong Daxue Xuebao, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2005). This historian summarizes this article as identifying five important social problems as being central to contemporary Chinese sociological research: social security, rural-urban relations, social stratification, sustainable development, and poverty. This same observer identifies neo-liberal perspectives as the most influential framework of research today. He finds that Marxist analysis is waning, and notes that there is some interest in such post-modern theorists as Bourdieu, Foucault, and Geertz.
This is an important topic and repays close investigation. This is so, partly so we can understand the evolution of a branch of international social science thinking; but much more so, because the Chinese social sciences will be more or less fruitful, depending on the theoretical and methodological choices made in the next few years. And therefore, it will be valuable to find ways of stimulating conversations about the foundational issues involved in formulating a philosophy of social science. Philosophy of social science is relevant to Chinese social science, in just as fundamental way as jurisprudence is relevant to the formation of judicial practice and the extension of a system of law.
Table 1a. Theoretical frameworks
and topics
|
New institutionalism |
2.80 |
|
Neo-liberal assumptions about social and economic change |
2.60 |
|
Analysis of ethnic groups and ethnic identities |
2.33 |
|
Analysis of gender relations |
2.20 |
|
Study of alternative social and economic institutions |
2.20 |
|
Study of local values and beliefs |
1.80 |
|
Social Darwinism |
1.75 |
|
Marxist theory of class conflict |
1.50 |
|
Moral economy theory |
1.50 |
Table 1b. Methodologies and research approaches
|
Qualitative “ethnographic” interviews of workers, women, peasants, officials, directors, migrants, and other categories of individuals |
2.80 |
|
Quantitative study of public opinion surveys |
2.40 |
|
Statistical analysis of large social datasets |
2.40 |
|
Statistical data gathering for use by public policy agencies |
2.40 |
|
Analysis of specific social causal mechanisms |
2.20 |
|
Rational choice theory |
2.20 |
|
Oral history research |
2.00 |
|
Comparative historical sociology |
1.40 |
Major problems for investigation
Causes of rural unrest:
These amount to a large problem of social unrest and rural conflict and sporadic violence.