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Daniel Little
University of
Michigan-Dearborn
February, 2008
There
have been two very different approaches to social explanation since the
nineteenth century, and they differ most fundamentally over a distinction
between “explanation” and “understanding” or “cause” and “meaning” (von Wright 1971). This distinction divides over
two ways of understanding a “why” question when it comes to social events. “Why
did it happen?” may mean “What caused it to happen?”; or it may mean “Why did
the agents act in such a way to bring it about?”. The hermeneutic approach holds that the most
basic fact of social life is the meaning of an action. Social life is
constituted by social actions, and actions are meaningful to the actors and to
the other social participants. Moreover, subsequent actions are oriented
towards the meanings of prior actions; so understanding the later action
requires that we have an interpretation of the meanings that various
participants assign to their own actions and those of others. So the social
sciences (or the human sciences) need to be hermeneutic: researchers need to devote
their attention to the interpretation of the meanings of social actions. (Central contributors to this tradition
include (Dilthey 1989), (Weber 1949), (Ricoeur 1976), and (Gadamer 1977). See (Sherratt 2006) for a very good treatment of
hermeneutic philosophy of social science.)
The tradition
of interpretation and historical science rejected the idea of human affairs
being governed by a set of “natural” laws; it sought instead to provide
interpretive understanding of the actions and meanings created by historically
and culturally situated actors. Wilhelm Windelband attempted to draw a clear
distinction between the nomothetic goals
of the natural sciences (generalizations, abstraction, and universal
statements) and the ideographic
goals of the human and historical sciences (particular instances, concrete
individuals, detailed understanding of the particular). Wilhelm Dilthey and his successors
articulated a theory of an interpretive human science that was starkly opposed
to positivism and the models of the natural sciences. Max Weber fell within
historicist and hermeneutic tradition as well. He defined sociology as the explanation of social action:
interpretation of the meaningful actions of individuals as oriented to the
actions of others. The method of verstehen is intended to permit the researcher to arrive at
hypotheses about the meanings of actions for the actor. (Fritz Ringer provides an excellent
account of the issues involved in this tradition in his treatment of Weber’s
methodological thinking; (Ringer 1997).)
This
approach places interpretation of meaning at the center of social inquiry. And
it drew much of its methodology and tools of inquiry from the hermeneutic
tradition—the tradition of biblical and literary interpretation stemming
from Dilthey, Rickert, and other German thinkers. This tradition is adapted to the human sciences by using the
metaphor of action as text. The interpreter (a biographer, for example)
considers the many elements of the action, life, or complex of actions, and
attempts to arrive at an interpretation that makes sense of the various parts.
A
central problem that authors in this tradition wrestle with is the “hermeneutic
circle”—the fact that there is no neutral, external standpoint from which
to objectively measure the meaning of a system of signs or actions. Instead,
interpretation begins and ends with the given—the text or the
action—and the only evidence available for assessing the interpretation
is interior to the text itself. So it may appear that interpretations are
self-confirming—an unhappy conclusion if we think that social explanations
ought to have rational justification and empirical support.
The
interpretive approach got a large boost from the fertile field of interpretive
anthropology in the 1960s and 1970s, especially through the work of such
anthropologists as Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1971b, 1980, 1983) and Victor Turner (Turner 1974). Geertz refers to the task of
anthropology as studying the social world as a web of significance, and he
describes the content of anthropological knowledge as “thick description” (Geertz 1971c). He writes, “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended
in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs,
and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of
law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. It is explication I am
after, construing social expression on their surface enigmatical” ((Geertz 1971c): 5). James
Clifford provides useful analysis of this approach to anthropology; (Clifford 1988).
There
are several valid insights incorporated in the verstehen approach. Most important is the
insistence on the point that social action is meaningful and intentional, and
that it is both desirable and feasible to arrive at interpretations of these
meanings. Moreover, being able to arrive at such interpretations is often
essential to historical and ethnographic explanation. Geertz's interpretation
of the Balinese cock-fight (Geertz 1971a) and Darnton's interpretation of
the great cat massacre (Darnton 1984) both illustrate this point: in
neither case would we understand the behavior without a deep interpretation of
the significances the participants attribute to their actions. And interpreting these meanings takes
disciplined, detailed hermeneutic and historical study.
This
said, it is incorrect to imagine that the verstehen approach is inconsistent with
the causal approach. Rather, the
two approaches are compatible and complementary. It is a fact that human action
is meaningful and intentional, and all social science must take account of this
fact. But it is also true that actions aggregate to larger causes and they have
effects on social outcomes. Meaningful, deliberate action is often the
mechanism through which a given set of institutional arrangements (a property
system, say) cause a social outcome (slow investment in new technologies, say).
So meanings are themselves both causes and components of causal mechanisms (a
point that Donald Davidson makes in the case of individual action; (Davidson 1963)).
Finally,
a social science that restricted itself to hermeneutic interpretation would be
radically incomplete. It would exclude from the scope of social science
research the whole range of causal relationships, structural influences on
action, and the workings of unintended consequences in social processes. Social scientists are better advised to
be eclectic in their approach to problems, incorporating causal and hermeneutic
analysis, quantitative and qualitative methods, and a range of explanatory
theories and causal mechanisms.
References
Clifford,
James. 1988. The predicament of culture : twentieth-century ethnography,
literature, and art. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Darnton,
Robert. 1984. The great cat massacre and other episodes in French cultural
history. New York: Basic Books.
Davidson,
Donald. 1963. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
Dilthey,
Wilhelm. 1989. Introduction to the human sciences. Edited by R. A. Makkreel and F. Rodi. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Gadamer,
Hans Georg. 1977. Philosophical hermeneutics. 1st paperback ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Geertz,
Clifford. 1971a. Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight: in Geertz 1971.
———.
1971b. The interpretation of cultures; selected essays. New York,: Basic Books.
———.
1971c. Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. In The
interpretation of cultures: selected essays.
New York: Basic Books.
———.
1980. Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———.
1983. Local knowledge : further essays in interpretive anthropology. New York: Basic Books.
Ricoeur,
Paul. 1976. Interpretation theory : discourse and the surplus of meaning. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
Ringer,
Fritz. 1997. Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and
Social Sciences. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Sherratt,
Yvonne. 2006. Continental philosophy of social science : hermeneutics,
genealogy, critical theory. Cambridge ; New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Turner,
Victor Witter. 1974. Dramas, fields, and metaphors; symbolic action in human
society, Symbol, myth, and ritual. Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press.
von
Wright, G. H. 1971. Explanation and understanding, Contemporary philosophy.
Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Weber,
Max. 1949. The Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Free Press.