*Algorithmic Game Theory.*Edited by Noam Nisan (Hebrew University), Tim Roughgarden (Stanford), Éva Tardos (Cornell), and Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Tech).

*An electronic version of the book is freely available online (see Tim Roughgarden's webpage for more info)*

- Game theory fundamentals: noncooperative game theory, classical game representations, zero-sum and general-sum games, stochastic games, solution concepts such as Nash and correlated equilibria, existence theorems
- Basic concepts in mathematical economics: abstract economies, Fisher and Arrow-Debreu models of competitive economies, general (market) equilibria and the existence of equilibrium prices in exchange markets
- Compact representations of large-population games: graphical games, potential games
- Graphical economies and the effect of network structure on market prices
- Computational complexity and algorithms for classical and modern game-theoretic models
- Connections to artificial intelligence and probabilistic graphical models (e.g., Bayesian and Markov networks) and inference methods (e.g., belief propagation) for reasoning under uncertainty
- Learning in games: fictitious play, best-response (gradient) dynamics, no-regret learning
- Evolutionary game theory: classical and network models
- Revealed preferences and learning games
- Mechanism design and combinatorial auctions
- Applications: network routing, network formation, interdependent security, vaccination, computational biology, multi-agent systems, (online) auctions, sponsored search

- John Nash. Non-Cooperative Games.
*The Annals of Mathematics*, Second Series, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Sep., 1951), pp. 286-295

*Nash's original existence proof based on Brower's fixpoint theorem*

- Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu. Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy.
*Econometrica*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1954), pp. 265-290

*Arrow and Debreu's proof of the existence of an equilibrium price in a competitive economy based on the concept of an abstract economy, which is a genralization of a normal-form game, and a corresponding generalization of Nash's result*

- Christos H.
Papadimitriou. The
Complexity of the Parity Argument and Other Inefficient proofs
of Existence (1991)

*Formally defines the computational complexity class PPAD and shows that finding fix-points based on existence theorems such as Brower's and Kakutany's is PPAD-complete. Also shows that finding equilibrium prices in some market exchange economies is PPAD-complete.*

- Julia Robinson. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game.
*The Annals of Mathematics*, Second Series, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Sep., 1951), pp. 296-301.

*Robinson's proof that "fictitious play" converges to a Nash equilibrium in 2-player zero-sum games*

- Sham M. Kakade, Michael
Kearns and Luis
E. Ortiz. Graphical Economics,
Seventeenth Annual Conference on Learning Theory (COLT), 2004.
**[PDF]** - Sham M. Kakade, Michael Kearns, Luis E. Ortiz, Robin Pemantle and Siddharth Suri. Economic Properties of Social Networks,
Neural Information Processing
Systems (NIPS), 2004.
**[PDF]**

- Mohammad - PPAD-completeness and Nash Eq. Computation
- Lokesh - Cryptography & Game Theory
- Abhinav - Interdependent Security Games
- Dengpan - Routing Games

Topic Presentations:

- Pralhad - Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- Utpal - Game Theory in Wireless Networks
- Irina - Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Games
- Dmytro - Sponsored Search

- Srivani - Computational Evolutionary Game Theory
- Sangwoo - ???
- Mark - ???

Project Presentations: